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NO. 47 DECEMBER 2019 Introduction 
The Expansion of Frontex 
Symbolic Measures and Long-term Changes in EU Border Management 
Raphael Bossong 
Strengthening external border management remains the lowest common denomina-
tor among Member States of the European Union (EU). Plans to expand the European 
Border and Coastguard Agency (Frontex) were formally adopted at the beginning of 
November. However, they will do little to meet the most pressing challenges of the 
EU’s migration policy. The goal of placing 10,000 border guards under the command 
of Frontex can only be achieved in the medium term. While some EU Member States 
currently use illegal practices to secure their national borders, Frontex is increasingly 
subject to legal controls; operational missions are only possible by invitation from the 
country of deployment. Without violating legal principles, Frontex alone will not be able 
to accelerate the return of those who are the subject of removal orders from the EU. 
Nevertheless, the forthcoming Frontex reform will provide some additional technical 
value for securing the EU’s external borders. Under changed political circumstances, 
the agency may be a pioneer for more European and operational security cooperation. 
 
The migration crisis in Europe could flare 
up again at any time. The voluntary coali-
tion of EU Member States – founded on 
Malta in September to distribute irregular 
migrants coming via the central Mediter-
ranean – is too small and does not include 
all those countries affected by the currently 
critical situation in the Aegean. The EU 
remains politically divided and dependent 
on third countries such as Turkey, which is 
increasingly pursuing conflicting interests. 
Contrary to the promises of the new Euro-
pean Commission, there is no prospect of a 
“new start” on common asylum policy in 
sight. 
However, the EU could agree to further 
strengthen its external borders and the 
European border management agency 
Frontex. This reform, introduced by the EU 
Commission in summer 2018, was agreed 
by all EU institutions towards the end 
of the last legislative period; the Council 
finally adopted it on 8 November 2019. 
In the 2019 European election campaign, 
politicians promoted the related objective 
of creating a force of 10,000 EU border 
guards in order to make its citizens aware 
of the Union’s growing security role. 
In principle, EU border police can help 
countries in crisis, such as Greece, to track 
irregular immigration and to combat smug-
gling networks more effectively. Large 
Frontex deployments could also send out a 
political signal: states with an EU external 
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border will no longer be left alone in 
dealing with irregular migration, thus 
restoring confidence in the security of 
the Schengen zone among other Member 
States. 
In 2016 a prior reform of Frontex was 
passed for similar purposes. Many of the 
measures envisaged at that time have not 
yet been fully implemented, for example 
the creation of a European reserve of 1,500 
border guards, the posting of Frontex liai-
son officers to Member States or the estab-
lishment of an EU vehicle pool. 
Obviously, there is a gap between the 
continuing acute migration crisis and the 
gradual development of Frontex. Smugglers 
are becoming increasingly professional 
and refugees are using alternative routes. 
In contrast, the new Frontex task force of 
10,000 EU border guards will not be fully 
deployed until 2027. Even at full strength, 
Frontex will only be able to provide opera-
tional support for selected sections of the 
EU’s external border. The main responsibil-
ity for migration control and border secu-
rity remains with the individual Member 
State, each with its own security structures 
and operational capacities. 
Both in 2016 and 2018, a majority of 
Member States rejected calls for Frontex to 
carry out completely independent controls 
at EU external borders, as this would violate 
their national sovereignty. The latest reform 
could also not be used to strengthen Fron-
tex specifically for the task of sea rescues in 
the Mediterranean. For many liberal critics, 
Frontex is therefore, more than ever, a sym-
bol of the EU’s illegitimate border policies, 
which violate human rights and push refu-
gees into ever more precarious situations. 
Instead, the EU should promote legal access 
routes and fair asylum procedures in all 
Member States. 
Real progress beyond the 
public debate on migration 
There will be no visible changes to how the 
EU’s external borders are protected. Even 
with a reinforced mandate, European citi-
zens will hardly experience directly how, 
where and why Frontex is deployed. It will 
primarily address specific weaknesses and 
promote technical reforms in national 
border management systems. 
At this technical level, however, the 
expansion of Frontex may provide added 
value in terms of security as well as up-
holding the principles of the rule of law. 
This requires a closer look at the four main 
pillars of the adopted reform: 
Firstly, Frontex will receive significantly 
more resources and administer them more 
independently. Around one third of the 
10,000 border guards will form a new cat-
egory of EU security staff directly recruited 
by Frontex. This partial decoupling from 
nationally seconded border police could 
make the planning and implementation of 
Frontex operations more reliable. In order 
to support the growth in personnel, the 
Frontex budget is to increase to around €9.4 
billion in total in the coming multiannual 
EU financial framework (2021–2027). If 
spread evenly over this funding period, 
Frontex would receive more than €1.3 bil-
lion per year, more than triple the current 
budget. As a result, Frontex will also be able 
to purchase high-quality equipment (e.g. 
ships, helicopters) and new border tech-
nology (e.g. drones). This makes European 
cooperation (also) materially more inter-
esting, especially for Member States on the 
EU’s external border. 
Secondly, the reform extends the agen-
cy’s remit and competences. Member States 
will be under a greater obligation to imple-
ment the concept of “integrated border 
management” in close consultation with 
Frontex. The aim is to implement targeted 
and effective control measures, both up-
stream and downstream of the geographical 
border. All Member States are under pres-
sure to boost their respective capacities and 
improve their organisational processes for 
integrated border management. In addition, 
Frontex will act as a coordination centre for 
pre-border area surveillance (by means of 
the EUROSUR system) and for the operation 
of risk-driven individualised border con-
trols, such as the analysis of Passenger 
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Name Records (PNR) data and the forth-
coming electronic entry permit for visa-free 
travellers (ETIAS). Last but not least, Frontex 
will be able to independently organise and 
implement return operations. 
Thirdly, the reform will boost Frontex’s 
international profile. For some years al-
ready, Frontex has been empowered to 
conclude administrative agreements with 
third countries, to post liaison officers 
abroad and to send border operations to 
neighbouring EU countries. Albania serves 
as a precedent for these operations: since 
spring 2019, a small Frontex team has been 
carrying out operational border security 
tasks there. The new regulation should 
make it possible to carry out similar opera-
tions in geographically more distant states. 
Fourthly, Frontex will be subjected to 
more oversight and legal obligations to up-
hold fundamental rights. The EU’s more 
recent data protection laws will be applied, 
as Frontex processes increasing volumes of 
personal data. The individual complaints 
mechanism for persons that may have been 
negatively affected by the actions of Frontex 
staff is to be strengthened. The executive 
director of Frontex now needs to justify his 
or her decisions with regard to such com-
plaints. Furthermore, the latest Frontex 
regulation includes a general clause to hold 
the agency itself liable for damages. This 
may become pertinent given that a new 
category of EU border guards is to be cre-
ated which could potentially exercise force 
or other coercive measures. The Frontex 
Fundamental Rights Office is to be better 
equipped and will in future draw up assess-
ments of deployment plans and coopera-
tion projects with third countries, as well as 
a produce an annual report on the activities 
of the agency. Finally, independent observ-
ers are to be deployed to all Frontex border 
security missions and return operations to 
ensure respect for human rights and refu-
gee law. 
All in all, the new Frontex regulation 
reinforces the agency’s existing profile to 
promote integrated border management. 
We will see increased technical checks on 
persons, data and risk analyses on irregular 
migration, and networking with third coun-
tries. In all likelihood, these measures will 
not significantly reduce the overall number 
of irregular migrants. Nevertheless, Frontex 
will become a key reference point for EU 
decision-makers and will stimulate further 
reforms at all political levels. Frontex is 
already the EU’s largest internal security 
agency in terms of personnel and funding 
and will continue to expand on a consider-
able scale. Other EU agencies working in 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
will, however, have to fight even harder to 
obtain sufficient resources and support for 
their equally growing tasks. In the area of 
migration management alone, this applies 
to the European Asylum Support Office 
(EASO), the European Agency for the opera-
tional management of large-scale IT systems 
in the area of freedom, security and justice 
(eu-LISA) as well as the European Union 
Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation 
(EUROPOL). Seen differently, the concentra-
tion of funds to create an independent EU 
border force and to acquire extensive tech-
nical means for border control could serve 
European integration in the long term, 
similar to the logic of the European Defence 
Fund and the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP). The new Frontex 
could, thus, serve as a pioneer on the way 
to a genuinely operational “security union” 
which focuses on European internal secu-
rity in a broad sense. 
This long-term perspective – rather than 
the current state of the European migration 
debate – necessitates a deeper and critical 
engagement with the future implementa-
tion of the new Frontex mandate. 
Return operations and the 
accountability of Frontex 
In expert as well as political debates, the 
issue of border control is increasingly 
surpassed by the question of “effective” 
returns of irregular migrants and rejected 
asylum seekers. The further evolution of 
Frontex is critical in this regard. Frontex 
will use its increased financial budget as 
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leverage: In return for more in-kind con-
tributions or training, the agency will 
deepen cooperation on returns with coun-
tries of origin and transit in the European 
neighbourhood. Third countries such as 
Tunisia are often primarily interested in 
technical equipment assistance and in 
strengthening border protection. 
In the course of the political negotia-
tions, the European Parliament (EP) pre-
vented Frontex being empowered to sup-
port return operations from non-European 
transit countries to countries of origin, for 
instance from Morocco to Nigeria. In such 
a constellation, it is almost impossible 
to guarantee that European human rights 
standards are adhered to. Nevertheless, 
some Member States, such as Poland, em-
phasised that it was absolutely necessary 
that Frontex helped to ensure that irregular 
migrants are stopped in the EU’s neighbour-
hood (for example in Bosnia and Herze-
govina) and directly returned to their coun-
try of origin. In light of this, the EP con-
siderably weakened the effectiveness of the 
latest Frontex reform. Further informal or 
bilateral agreements on returns between EU 
Member States and various transit states in 
the EU’s neighbourhood are, therefore, to 
be expected in the coming years. 
In contrast, human rights and refugee 
organisations argue that the supervisory 
mechanisms for Frontex remain far too 
weak. There is still no credible sanctioning 
mechanism for human rights violations 
committed by Frontex itself or with regard 
to the situation of refugees in countries 
where Frontex operates. Sending independ-
ent observers to protect the rights of refu-
gees – as provided for in the new Frontex 
Regulation – is of little help. Ultimately, 
Frontex can only terminate its own opera-
tions in response to critical reports and 
allegations. So far, there is no precedent 
for such a decision, which diminishes the 
credibility of the agency. In any case, the 
suspension of a Frontex mission is not an 
effective instrument to exert pressure on 
Member States or third countries that sys-
tematically violate fundamental rights. That 
is one more reason why, from the point of 
view of refugee organisations, Frontex must 
not expand its cooperation with countries 
of transit and origin. 
The EU must seek a balance between 
these positions in the coming years. Mem-
ber States are pressing for a measurable 
reduction in irregular immigration and for 
more people to be expelled from the EU. 
By contrast, the new EP and the responsible 
LIBE committee will continue to stress that 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
the current standards under the Common 
European Asylum System must be observed. 
Recruitment and training of 
EU border guards 
The other major challenge in implementing 
the forthcoming Frontex reform is to devel-
op and train new staff. In October 2019, 
the agency published adverts to recruit 700 
European border guards. These forces will 
no longer be seconded from the Member 
States, as has been the case to date, but will 
be recruited directly by Frontex. The entire 
standing Frontex border force will still be 
primarily composed of national border 
guards. The current objective is to have 
1,500 national border police officers on call; 
by 2021 the figure is expected to be around 
5,000. At the same time, there is to be a 
shift from short-term to long-term deploy-
ments to Frontex. Member States are, there-
fore, becoming less and less flexible in the 
use of their human resources for border 
security. 
The new Frontex mandate also stipulates 
that the number of EU border guards should 
double from 1,500 to 3,000 following an 
evaluation in 2024. Together with the forces 
of the Member States, Frontex is to reach 
its full strength of 10,000 border guards by 
2027. German politicians have repeatedly 
argued that this process must be accelerat-
ed. In practice, these appeals generate little 
resonance. Several Member States already 
think the target date of 2027 is too chal-
lenging. Human resources are lacking at 
both the national and the European level, 
not least as there is a constant increase in 
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tasks and requirements for internal secu-
rity. In Germany, for example, this applies 
to a possible intensification of so-called 
Schleierfahndung (dragnet controls) in border 
areas. 
Moreover, the EU is concerned that there 
will be an insufficient response to Frontex’s 
new job advertisements. Applicants may 
not be sufficiently qualified and/or not all 
Member States may be represented equally, 
not least because employees in Warsaw 
(where the agency is based) receive below-
average pay compared to other European 
countries. Salaries for EU employees are off-
set using a correction coefficient depending 
on the cost of living compared to Belgium 
and Luxembourg; in the case of Poland it is 
about 30 percent lower. 
The creation of a new category of EU bor-
der guards also raises a number of further 
questions. For example, their training and 
professional standards need clarifying. 
National border guards seconded to Frontex 
draw on the knowledge and legal frame-
works of their respective home countries. 
In its latest call for applications, Frontex 
mentions a six-month training course to 
become a European border guard. In order 
to make this possible in practice, the call 
is initially directed at former employees 
of national security and law enforcement 
agencies who could bring broadly com-
parable work experience to the table. In 
this context, it should be noted that Fron-
tex’s most recent recruitment drive is also 
aimed at former members of the military. 
With such a pragmatic recruitment strat-
egy, it must be ensured that the new EU’s 
own border guards adhere to high stand-
ards. The Common European Asylum 
System (GEAS) and the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights must be respected. 
Frontex forces and the 
country of deployment 
Conversely, it remains to be seen whether 
the pool of new Frontex forces will be used 
extensively in practice. The Member States 
should implement the agency’s recommen-
dations in their respective border manage-
ment systems. The recent reform reinforces 
the right of the Frontex Director to make 
reform proposals to individual states in this 
regard. Should a Member State fail to take 
appropriate measures, even if called upon 
by further joint decisions by the Commis-
sion and the Council of Home Affairs Minis-
ters, the Council may ultimately decide to 
suspend that Member State as a full mem-
ber of the Schengen zone. 
These mechanisms confer considerable 
power on Frontex as an expert authority. 
Nevertheless, an operational Frontex mis-
sion can only be deployed in cooperation 
with the respective external border state. 
The inviting state also commands the 
Frontex forces on the ground. National 
responsibility for public security under 
Article 4 (2) of the Treaty of the European 
Union is thus preserved. From a practical 
point of view, Frontex forces also need 
to cooperate closely with the country of 
deployment. For example, irregular 
migrants or suspects must be handed 
over to local authorities to initiate asylum 
proceedings or police investigations. A 
unilateral supranational takeover of sec-
tions of the EU’s external borders by Fron-
tex forces is therefore neither legally 
possible nor realistic. 
Meanwhile, national and European bor-
der guards are obliged to grant all arriving 
persons a fair asylum procedure upon 
request, including irregular migrants. They 
must be granted leave to remain on Euro-
pean territory until the procedure has been 
completed. Only in exceptional cases should 
surveillance systems that extend into areas 
beyond European external borders be used 
to involve neighbouring states, so that the 
latter can intercept irregular migrants at 
an early stage. Indirect European migration 
control through data transfer to third par-
ties outside the EU is illegal if there is no 
reliable humanitarian protection for the 
people concerned. 
Thus, an increased Frontex presence at 
Europe’s external borders cannot be equated 
with a clear reduction in irregular migra-
tion. The main task of Frontex operations is 
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to better record and register migratory 
movements which may entail taking legal 
responsibility for persons seeking protec-
tion. As long as no Community mechanism 
for the distribution of refugees within the 
EU is established, individual Member States 
will remain tempted to pursue measures 
that are contrary to European migration 
and refugee law. Examples are the “waving 
through” of irregular migrants, border 
pushbacks and “hot returns”, the use of 
systematic police violence in border regions 
or maintaining inhumane reception con-
ditions as a deterrence. It cannot be pre-
sumed that states at the EU’s external bor-
der will voluntarily invite large Frontex 
missions, if such missions are accompanied 
by greater transparency and stricter control 
over border security practices – as should 
legally be the case. This assumption is 
based on the fact that several external bor-
der states in Southern and Eastern Europe 
have officially spoken out against the new 
Frontex reform. 
Frontex for border procedures 
As an alternative to border controls, the 
new Frontex forces could help speed up 
asylum procedures near borders. A number 
of Member States with EU external borders 
could create facilities that go beyond the 
existing and often dysfunctional hotspots 
in Italy and Greece. Irregular migrants and 
asylum seekers should not only be regis-
tered and identified there, but should also 
receive a decision on their protection status 
as soon as possible. Frontex could provide 
security support for such centres and 
organise the rapid repatriation of rejected 
applicants. 
The concept of so-called “controlled 
centres”, which the European Council con-
sidered in the summer of 2018, was already 
headed in this direction. These closed cen-
tres should, as far as possible, provide for 
equivalent evaluation procedures of irregu-
lar migrants, after which they would be dis-
tributed throughout the Union as asylum 
seekers or repatriated. To this end, the 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 
would eventually have to be empowered to 
make decisions, i.e. to become a genuine 
EU asylum agency. Europol would have to 
devote more attention to security screening 
irregular migrants and combatting smug-
gling. These EU agencies could thus act in 
joint “European support teams for migra-
tion management”. 
In anticipation of its EU Presidency in 
the second half of 2020, Germany has sub-
mitted a renewed version of this concept to 
be debated over the coming months. Simi-
larly, there should be a timely preliminary 
examination of asylum seekers in closed 
centres near the border. If there were no 
obvious reasons for refusal, applicants 
could be distributed to other EU Member 
States where a complete asylum procedure 
would be undertaken. Frontex would also 
be responsible for returning asylum seekers 
rejected at that first stage. 
No substantial progress can be expected 
on this until the situation in Greece im-
proves significantly. The country’s prelimi-
nary screening and immediate return pro-
cedures based on the EU-Turkey agreement 
have largely failed so far. The new conser-
vative Greek government has decided to 
dismantle the existing camps on several 
Greek islands and to create new, closed 
facilities for asylum seekers on the main-
land. At the time of writing, most observers 
are deeply sceptical that the Greek author-
ities will manage to ensure faster and fairer 
asylum procedures as well as decent recep-
tion conditions and living conditions in 
these new centres. In addition, the return 
of irregular migrants to Turkey is more 
problematic than ever under the current 
political conditions. 
Closed centres for European asylum and 
return procedures also face general legal 
challenges. For example, if EU agencies were 
to take over these centres and procedures 
directly – be it only for the preliminary 
examination of asylum claims – individual 
rights to a fair trial remain with the respec-
tive country. In the case of measures as 
sensitive as forced returns, legal remedies 
can at most be sped up, but should by no 
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means be effectively annulled. Northern 
European Member States, too, struggle to 
uphold these guarantees and avoid asylum 
seekers being detained for a disproportion-
ately lengthy period. All EU Member States 
must continue to build up their national 
capacities for processing asylum claims 
swiftly and according to the rule of law. 
Only then can Frontex make a sustainable 
contribution to screening and returning 
asylum applicants in closed centres. 
Frontex for international 
missions 
One last option for the growing Frontex 
border force is to deploy them on inter-
national border missions. In this context, 
Frontex staff may carry out border control 
tasks in third countries, which go beyond 
coordinating returns. The first such Frontex 
mission started in Albania in spring 2019. 
This mission, which currently consists of 
slightly over 60 border police officers from 
the EU, is considered a successful pilot 
project. Albanian authorities have almost 
no border guards and technical resources 
and are grateful for any assistance. Similar 
missions to strengthen operational border 
controls may follow in Montenegro and 
other Western Balkan countries, with the 
exception of Kosovo. The necessary status 
agreements have already been signed and 
are in the process of being ratified. These 
legal steps contrast with the humanitarian 
situation of irregular migrants, some of 
whom have been stuck in the region for 
years. Further flight movements from Tur-
key to Greece will aggravate the situation. 
Future Frontex missions in the Western 
Balkans will therefore operate in a much 
tenser environment. The refusal to open 
EU accession negotiations with Northern 
Macedonia and Albania will further weaken 
European influence. 
Against this background, the latest Fron-
tex reform extends the permissible theatre 
of operations beyond states that directly 
share a border with the EU. In purely legal 
terms, this makes it possible for Frontex to 
conduct missions in North Africa or other 
transit countries and countries of origin 
for migration to Europe. Frontex is already 
present in many of these countries in an 
advisory capacity and provides technical 
support or equipment. However, Frontex 
missions with operational tasks depend on 
an invitation from the respective country of 
deployment – comparable to the situation 
within the EU (see above). It is not clear 
which third country would wish to issue 
such an invitation and how this would 
overlap with EU CSDP operations. Particu-
larly in Sahel countries, both military 
operations and civilian missions have been 
extended to include border protection or 
newly established for this purpose. Com-
parable Frontex missions would focus even 
more explicitly on the EU’s interest in 
deterring and detaining irregular migrants 
before they reach the shores of the Mediter-
ranean. A maximalist scenario would be as 
follows: Frontex missions secure and sup-
port humanitarian reception camps in 
third countries, to which irregular migrants 
could be taken after being intercepted 
(rescued) at sea and/or in which they could 
file an extraterritorial asylum application 
for Europe. Previous pilot projects in Niger 
have shown, however, that only a very 
small number of vulnerable persons were 
relocated to Europe for humanitarian pro-
tection. This is one of the reasons why the 
African Union has clearly rejected what 
are known as “disembarkation platforms” 
or new centres in which extraterritorial 
asylum applications can be lodged. 
The more relevant question today is 
whether the establishment of 10,000 Fron-
tex border guards undermines the CSDP’s 
capacity to develop its management of 
civilian crises. The EU is currently pursuing 
a new approach with its Civilian CSDP Com-
pact. National police officers and border 
guards are both eligible to take part in 
either CSDP or Frontex missions. So far, the 
Union has not presented an overarching 
concept for a respective division of labour. 
One could assume that CSDP operations 
are to continue to focus on security sector 
reform and conflict management, while 
SWP Comment 47 
December 2019 
8 
Frontex missions could only take on nar-
rowly defined border management tasks in 
third countries. If the political situation in 
Europe changes, Frontex may also become 
more active in sea rescues beyond coastal 
waters. In this context, Frontex is obliged 
to apply all EU legislation on asylum and 
refugee protection, which is not necessarily 
the case with comparable CSDP operations, 
such as EU Sophia. Yet a recent ruling of 
the Court of Justice has blocked external 
requests for more transparency with regard 
to the movements and operational deploy-
ment of Frontex ships. It remains, there-
fore, open to debate as to how a renewed 
European effort for rescue missions on 
the Mediterranean Sea should best be 
organised. 
Recommendations 
The latest reform of Frontex requires a 
long-term vision. If political decision-
makers place too great an emphasis on 
quick recruitment of EU border guards, the 
risks will outweigh the benefits. Moreover, 
the expansion of Frontex cannot mask 
the lack of consensus on how to deal with 
irregular migration. Additional steps to 
strengthen controls at the EU’s borders 
are not decisive. The thorny problems of 
“burden-sharing”, the development of 
capacities in national asylum systems and 
the political willingness to promote “safe, 
orderly and regular” migration have to be 
tackled head on. 
The EU should also remember that the 
Frontex reform was meant to be flanked by 
a genuine European asylum authority. An 
upgraded EASO with more competences 
to supervise the Member States and make 
decisions at early stages of individual 
asylum claims would be needed if (closed) 
application and processing centres in the 
vicinity of EU external borders are to make 
sense. All further reform efforts must en-
sure two things: the rule of law and access 
to effective legal remedies in states of 
arrival. The expansion of Frontex, in con-
trast, should not be abused to accelerate 
return operations at the cost of fundamen-
tal rights. 
Rather, Frontex should focus on its core 
mandate, namely to promote professional 
standards and new technical means for bor-
der control. This should be done with the 
highest possible degree of transparency and 
accountability for irregular migrants and 
those seeking protection. This applies both 
to the EU’s own border guards and to its 
cooperation with national border police 
forces, both inside and outside Europe. In 
times of persistently high migration pres-
sure, this is not an unrealistic yardstick, but 
the necessary basis for a viable long-term 
integration of European security author-
ities. 
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